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TOO ILL TO BE KILLED: MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL COMPETENCY TO BE EXECUTED
PURSUANT TO THE DEATH PENALTY
Linda Malone*
Abstract
Mentally ill individuals are being housed in prisons and jails throughout
the country. Due to decreased funding and overpopulation of correctional
facilities, individuals with pre-existing illnesses, as well as others who
develop illnesses, are in severe need of mental health services and punished
for their ailments through the use of solitary confinement, long prison
sentences, and lack of care. The stress created by such conditions is amplified
for mentally ill prisoners who are awaiting execution or the dismissal of their
death row sentences. These individuals must show that they are competent to
stand trial, exhibit the mental state required for the committal of the alleged
crime, be subject to the death penalty, and finally, be executed. Without a
showing of competency for each time-sensitive element, prolonged prison
stays are in order for these mentally ill inmates. The speed of the justice
system, combined with outlawed execution drugs, has left these prisoners
aging and helpless as they await their untimely sentences, categorized by
some as cruel and unusual punishment.
Keywords: mentally ill, competency, trial, mental health, death penalty,
death row, insanity defense, mental state, aging
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are several stages in criminal proceedings when the defendant's
mental state must be evaluated.' It would seem likely, with so many
processes, that no one who is mentally ill by mental health standards would
end up in a prison cell, much less on death row, rather than in a mental
institution receiving treatment. The reality is quite different, however.2
Individuals for whom mental health professionals would agree are mentally
ill are often processed in the criminal justice system, and increasingly so as
publicly available mental health services and institutional openings have
diminished.3 Jails and prisons have absorbed these individuals whenever
there is a chance that they might do harm to themselves or others, and even
if neither harm is likely or probable.'
These are only the individuals who have pre-existing mental illness prior
to the criminal charge. Another segment of the prison population may
become mentally ill while in jail or prison.' Overcrowding, long prison
sentences, solitary confinement, and inferior physical and mental health
services in prison are sufficiently stressful that it is hardly surprising that
mental health and physical health problems may ensue.6 Although adequate
medical and psychological services, in theory, are available at least in the
state and federal prison systems, the expanding need for such services may
1. See generally Am. Bar Ass'n, Criminal Responsibility/Mitigation in Sentencing, 25 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 371 (2001).
2. See generally ALISA ROTH, INSANE: AMERICA'S CRIMINAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS
(2018). See also Jan Hoffman, She Went to Jail for a Drug Relapse. Tough Love or Too Harsh?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/healthldrug-addict-relapse-opioids.html
(explaining that even though mentally ill individuals are still jailed, treatment and medication are more
effective).
3. See ROTH, supra note 2, at 135 (mentally ill Virginian who stole $5 worth of food treated like a
"circus animal" and died of starvation; schizophrenic Floridian boiled to death in a 160-degree shower);
Hoffman, supra note 2.
4. Sam Dolnick, The 'Insane' Way Our Prison System Handles the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/books/review/insane-alisa-roth.html; see ROTH, supra
note 2, at 58 (many offenders committed minor violations yet ended up in prisons rather than receiving
mental health related treatments). Roth states, "[T]housands of desperately sick people receiving minimal
treatment for their mental health problems, being cared for by people with little training for that aspect of
the job, and all this at great expense-simply because they have been charged with a crime." ROTH, supra
note 2, at 58.
5. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325
(2006).
6. Id. at 354 ("[R]estriction of environmental stimulation and social isolation .. . are strikingly
toxic to mental functioning, producing a stuporous condition associated with perceptual and cognitive
impairment and affective disturbances.").
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not be met due to decreases in funding for such services and the expanding
prison population.7
In addition to these general problems, the unique stress of being on death
row cannot be overestimated. Long years of appeals, other proceedings, and
death sentences stayed only to be upheld are endemic. 8 Death row prisoners
have walked to their execution only to be told it is delayed.9 Dates are set for
executions and dates are changed. 10 More recently, how a prisoner is to be
killed has become a serious issue as drugs have become unavailable." Death
rows have also become the geriatric wards of prisons, with more prisoners
old enough and physically ill enough that imposing any method of execution
is fraught with medical uncertainties and the possibility of excessive
suffering. 12 As some of these problems seem inherent and unavoidable in a
criminal justice system that recognizes the death penalty, is it an acceptable
cost to society, much less the individual defendant? However one answers
this question, the increasing incidence of death row prisoners who are
physically or mentally ill is a growing epidemic that presents disturbing
questions of execution in a way that satisfies the most basic of humane
considerations. 3 The last bastion of the purposes of criminal punishment-
retribution-has become the argument of last resort in such cases before the
Supreme Court. What has not been fully evaluated in opinions over how to
kill, like Glossip v. Gross,14 is whether retribution is even served when the
standard for mental competency for execution is set so low.
7. Max Hutton, The Lack of Federal Funding for Mental Health and the Criminalization of
Mental Illness, PSYCHE, https://psyche.media/the-lack-of-federal-funding-for-mental-health-and-the-
criminalization-of-mental-illness (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) (showing federal funding cuts in the 1980s and
1990s has contributed to approximately "20% of all state and federal prisoners [who] suffer from a mental
illness") (citing Mental Health by the Numbers, NAT'L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.
nami.org/learn-more/mental-health-by-the-numbers (last visited Jan. 2, 2019)).
8. See generally Caycie D. Bradford, Waiting to Die, Dying to Live: An Account of the Death Row
Phenomenon from a Legal Viewpoint, 5 NITERDISC. J. HUM. RTs. L. 77 (2010).
9. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 81-85 (describing that the delay between sentencing and execution
is cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; in the United States, the average
wait time is twelve years); Margaret Renkl, America Has Stopped Being a Civilized Nation, N.Y. TMES
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/opinion/death-penalty-billy-ray-irick.html.
10. Bradford, supra note 8, at 86 (delays are not the fault of the prisoners, and prisoners have been
known to waive their rights to appeals in order to be executed sooner).
11. Jennifer Home, Lethal Injection Drug Shortage, COUNCIL ST. GOVERNMENTS (Aug. 2017),
http://www.esg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/issue65_4.aspx ("[N]ationwide shortage of sodium
thiopental, an anesthetic that is part of the three-drug cocktail used in lethal injections, has thrown capital
punishment in the United States into disarray, delaying executions and forcing the change of execution
protocols in several states.").
12. America's Geriatric Prison Population Is Growing, ECONOMIST (May 26, 2018), bttps://www.
economist.com/united-states/2018/05/26/americas-geriatric-prison-population-is-growing.
13. See id.
14. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). See generally Linda A. Malone, The Death Knell for
the Death Penalty and the Significance of Global Realism to Its Abolition from Glossip v. Gross to
Brumfield v. Cain, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 107 (2016).
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II. MENTAL COMPETENCY
A. Competency to Stand Trial
There are four different contexts in which mental competency is
evaluated in criminal proceedings: (1) competency to stand trial;
(2) competency to be convicted of the criminal offense (the required mens
rea and the defense of insanity); (3) competency to be subject to the death
penalty (exclusion of juveniles and the "intellectually disabled"); and
(4) competency to be executed. Different legal tests have been devised for
each competency context at the Supreme Court level but only in a relatively
limited number of decisions (compared, for example, to specific First or
Fourth Amendment issues), and often leaving application of a very
generalized test explicitly to the lower courts to refine.'5
The first context before trial is competency to stand trial. In Dusky v.
United States, the defendant was a thirty-three-year-old man with a prior
diagnosis of schizophrenia, depression, hallucinations, and alcoholism.'
6
Despite an evaluation by the psychiatric staff that he was suffering from the
above, that he could not remember most of the crime, and that he had been
drinking extensively and taking tranquilizers before the crime, he was found
competent to stand trial and the competency determination was affirmed on
appeal.' 7 The Supreme Court reversed, requiring that for competency to stand
trial the defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he
has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against
him."' 8 The 1960 decision is one of several in which mental incompetency
seems compellingly demonstrated but that did not preclude a conviction or
affirmation on appeal.19
B. Competency to be Convicted
During the trial itself, mental state, and thus competency, arises in the
requirement (if any) for the crime charged of mens rea, or the mental state
15. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Won't Hear Challenges to Arizona's Death Penalty Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/supreme-court-death-penalty.btml; see
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (explaining that if not competent to represent oneself in
court, a defendant may be assigned legal counsel by the court); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396
(1993) (pleading guilty requires competency as required under Dusky); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1975) (holding a defendant must "understand the nature and object of the proceedings"); Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960) (per curiam) (discussing whether defendant has sufficient
understanding of consultation with attorney and the proceedings against him).
16. See Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1959), rev'dper curiam, 362 U.S. 402
(1960).
17. Id.
18. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
19. Id.
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required for the crime.2 °  The complexities of mens rea and its
offense-specific nature relates to mental competency particularly with the
so-called subjective mens rea offenses as opposed to objective mens rea
offenses.2' Mens rea, as outlined in the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code, delineates four categories of purpose, knowledge, recklessness,
and criminal negligence.22 The first three require deliberateness in the sense
of purpose and subjective awareness of a very high degree of risk
(knowledge) or high degree of risk (recklessness), in contrast to the risk of
which a reasonable person would have been cognizant (criminal
negligence).23 Purpose, knowledge, and recklessness, therefore, require the
judge or jury, essentially, to read the mind of the defendant. These subjective
standards necessarily entail assessment of the accused's mental capacity,
ranging through a multitude of factors, such as education or verbal skills to
cultural or religious background.24 Intellectual disabilities, such as a low IQ
or mental illness, are directly relevant to the subjective standards.25 Their
relevance to negligence gets into the thorny and disputed issue of what
personal characteristics of the defendant may be taken into consideration in
assessing what a "reasonable" person would have known.26 The Model Penal
Code suggests that the physical characteristics of the accused can be
incorporated into the assessment.27 Nevertheless, the lines inevitably blur
between physical and mental characteristics. 28 To what extent can the age of
a twelve-year-old be considered without entailing a subjective assessment of
the minor's mental capabilities?
Obviously, a defendant may be competent to stand trial under the Dusky
test but not have the necessary mens rea.29 Less evidently, a defendant may
be incompetent to stand trial but have had the requisite mens rea for the
20. Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens
Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1074 (2007) ("Crimes are defined
by their 'elements,' which always include a prohibited act and in most cases a mental state, a [mens rea],
such as intent.").
21. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 at 225-52 (AM. LAW INST. 1985);
Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology ofMens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317-21
(2009) (describing the uncertainties and difficulties that arise when distinguishing different mental states
and elements in the Model Penal Code); Morse & Hoffman, supra note 20, at 1090 (highlighting the
complexities of the subjective and objective standards by stating that "even if [a] mental disorder does
[not] negate subjective mental states such as purpose, intention, knowledge, or conscious awareness of
risk, it would never negate the objective negligence standard").
22. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(1) at 225.
23. ld. § 2.02(2) at 225-26.
24. See generally Morse & Hoffman, supra note 20 (discussing other factors that should be
considered when analyzing the mens rea of a crime).
25. See generally id.
26. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 at 242.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (discussing whether the
defendant has sufficient understanding of the proceedings against her as well as her ability to consult with
an attorney).
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crime.30 Each of the four contexts for mental competency are time-specific.31
Competency to stand trial is an ongoing evaluation until the accused is tried
or released.32 The accused may have become incompetent to stand trial before
trial begins but may have been perfectly capable of forming the necessary
mens rea at the time of the crime. 33 A defendant found incompetent to stand
trial may, at some point in time, become competent to stand trial.34 For
example, if the defendant has been failing to take medication to treat a mental
problem or illness, but accepts such medication while being detained, the
medication may sufficiently correct the problem for the Dusky standard to be
met. When the defendant refuses to accept medication, the issue of when a
defendant may be forced to take medication, especially when the medication
is only necessary to make the defendant competent to stand trial, has been
addressed in several cases, including at the Supreme Court level. 35 Also, the
courts have had to struggle with how long a pre-trial detainee may be held to
restore competency to stand trial.36
The affirmative defense of insanity, like determinations of mens rea, is
time-specific to the time of the alleged offense. 37 There are a number of
variations of the insanity defense, such as those laid out in Clark v. Arizona.
38
30. See generally id.
31. 18U.S.C. § 4241 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1998).
32. Id. § 4241.
33. Id. §§ 4241-4242.
34. Id. § 4241.
35. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 186 (2003) (vacating the decision of the Eighth Circuit
and remanding the case for further proceedings, in holding the Eighth Circuit Court erred in authorizing
the forced administration of medication solely for the purpose of making the defendant competent to stand
trial. The government may, however, "pursue its request for forced medication" if the defendant poses a
danger to himself or others.); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (reversing the decision of the
Nevada Supreme Court and remanding for further proceedings, in holding when a defendant seeks to end
administration of antipsychotic medication, the State must then establish a reason for needing the drug.
The Court held that the record contained "no finding that might support a conclusion that administration
of antipsychotic medication was necessary."); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (reversing
the decision of the Washington Supreme Court and remanding for further proceedings, in holding the
procedures of the state did not violate the defendant's due process right when it comes to the right to refuse
treatment).
36. See Mitch Mitchell, Insane System? Arlington Man Bounces Between Jail, State Hospital,
STAR-TELEGRAM (May 9, 2016, 4:23 PM) https://www.startelegram.corn/news/local/community/
arlington/article76594692.html (discussing an inmate's lack of trial as a result of "the state's
merry-go-round for the criminally insane" from prison to mental hospitals-never seeing trial); see also
N.M. SENTENCING COMM'N, EFFECT OF COMPETENCY AND DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION ON LENGTH OF
STAY IN A SAMPLE OF NEW MEXICO DETENTION FACILITIES 4 (2013) ("Arrestees with competency
proceedings had a longer median length of stay in jail.").
37. 18U.S.C. § 17 (1986).
38. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-52 (2006) ("Even a cursory examination of the traditional
Anglo-American approaches to insanity reveals significant differences among them, with four traditional
strains variously combined to yield a diversity of American standards. The main variants are the cognitive
incapacity, the moral incapacity, the volitional incapacity, and the product-of-mental-illness tests.")
(footnote omitted).
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The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 provides:
(a) Affirmative Defense-
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that,
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental
disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of Proof-
The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear
and convincing evidence.3
9
This test for the defense of insanity in federal courts is a good example
of the confusion that can occur between the affirmative defense of insanity
(i.e., all the elements of the criminal charge have been proven) and not guilty
because the mens rea required for the crime has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The central aspect of every test for insanity is that to some
extent the defendant was too mentally ill to understand, know, or appreciate
the wrongfulness of the criminal offense.4" The federal test and many others
have a second prong requiring that the defendant "was unable to appreciate
the nature and quality.., of his acts."' The quintessential classroom
example satisfying this prong is the defendant that thought he was wringing
out a towel, but he was actually wringing someone's neck, killing the victim.
Technically, however, the defendant in that circumstance lacks the necessary
mens rea of intent (as in purposely or knowingly) for murder because he did
not mean to kill.42 It is not necessary to establish an affirmative defense of
insanity because the elements of the crime, including mens rea, have not been
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.43 In that sense, statutes that include
this second prong do so unnecessarily because a defendant in the
circumstance of mental illness does not have the mens rea for the crime. 44 In
contrast, consider a defendant who admits to killing a victim and wanting to
do so, but the defendant did so because he was directed to by the devil or
39. 18 U.S.C. § 17.
40. See, e.g., Clark, 548 U.S. 735. While there have been many variations and tests over the years
when it comes to the insanity defense, the M'Naghten case laid out a universal idea, or standard, that is
still, in some varying degree, used in the United States today; it looks at the cognitive ability to distinguish
between right and wrong. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); Henry F. Fradella, From
Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 15-19 (2007).
41. 18U.S.C. § 17(a).
42. See id.
43. See Linda A. Malone, Is There Really a Difference Between Justification and Excuse, or Did We
Academics Make It Up?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REv. 321, 321-22 (2009).
44. See id.; e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (containing the second prong).
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because he thought the victim was conspiring with aliens.45 The defendant in
both circumstances had intent to kill, but may be found not guilty by virtue
of insanity.
C. Excluded Categories of Defendants Subject to the Death Penalty
With regard to the third context, the Supreme Court has determined that
two categories of individuals are ineligible for the death penalty. In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court concluded that no one eighteen or under at the time of
the crime could be subject to the death penalty.46 In Atkins v. Virginia, the
Court held that the "mentally retarded" (subsequently replaced in Hall v.
Florida by the term intellectually disabled47) could not be subject to the death
penalty.48 In Atkins, the defendant, despite an IQ of 59, had been convicted
of murder and his conviction was affirmed.4 9 The underlying rationale in both
decisions for the exclusionary categories was twofold: (1) the difficulties and
inequities for the intellectually disabled and juveniles to assist in their
defense, and (2) no purpose, including retribution and deterrence, would be
served by executing individuals whose moral fault for their crimes was
attributable to insufficiently developed competency.5° Presumably, the first
45. See generally Clark, 548 U.S. 735 (involving a defendant charged with murder arguing that
aliens were trying to get him); State v. Medina, 227 Conn. 456 (1993) (involving a defendant charged
with murder arguing that the devil made him do it).
46. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
47. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 707-11 (2014).
48. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded
is excessive and that the Constitution restricts a state's power to impose such a penalty on the mentally
retarded). The Court held there to be a consistent history in exempting mentally retarded offenders from
the death penalty due to the overwhelming view in society that those who are mentally retarded are "less
culpable than the average criminal"; some states still allow this practice, but it is very uncommon. Id. at
316. The Court outlines two reasons for why the mentally retarded should be excluded from execution.
See id at 318. First, the Court is "not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will
measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty." Id. at 321. Second, the
Court finds that mentally retarded offenders are more at risk for wrongful execution due to their reduced
ability to make a persuasive showing of mitigation. See id at 352.
49. See id. at 309-10.
50. Id. at 320; see Hall, 572 U.S. at 707-11.
The Court in Atkins v. Virginia declared that the execution of mentally retarded offenders is
cruel and unusual for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. The petitioner, Daryl Atkins, was
convicted for the abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder of Eric Nesbitt. The petitioner
argued, by way of IQ testing, that he was mentally retarded and argued that his execution would
be a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The jury concluded, and the Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed, that although Atkins may be mildly retarded, this fact did not mitigate the
violent nature of the offense, and sentenced him to death. The United States Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Virginia Supreme Court, holding that the execution of mentally
retarded offenders is "excessive" and violates the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel
and unusual punishment.
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, focused on several factors in
reaching this outcome. First, the Court discussed the growing national consensus against
executing mentally retarded individuals, shown by new state legislation on the matter, jury
polls, and national opinion polls on society's "evolving standards of decency." Second, the
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rationale could be adequately served by a more thorough and demanding
application of the Dusky test for competency for the intellectually disabled.
By incorporating intellectual disability as an exclusion from the death
penalty, rather than as a disqualification entirely from trial and thus
conviction, the intellectually disabled can stand trial, be convicted, and
receive all punishments but the most serious sanction of the death penalty.5'
The aftermath of the Atkins decision, discussed infra, reveals how minimal
the exclusionary protection of Atkins can be for those with significant
intellectual disabilities, even from the death penalty.
D. Mental Competency to Be Executed
The fourth context is the most recently problematic of any context, and
is before the current term of the Court in multiple decisions. 2 The death row
prisoner must be, ultimately, competent to be killed.53 The Orwellian nature
of the term "competence to be executed" is an indication of the immense legal
and moral complications of the standard.54 In Ford v. Wainwright, in 1986,
the Court adopted the common law rule that the "insane" could not be
executed. 55 The defendant was determined to be legally competent at the time
of the offense, at trial, and at sentencing.56 The three psychiatrists who
Court focused on the effects of mental retardation on the understanding of the legal system and
on a mentally retarded offender's capacity to protect successfully his rights. The Court
reasoned that a mentally retarded offender, while competent to stand trial, has "diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate... and to understand the
reactions of others." Although their diminished capacity does not render the offenders exempt
from all criminal sanction, it does "diminish their personal culpability." Furthermore, the Court
found that the death penalty fails to serve a deterrent purpose in the case of mentally retarded
offenders in that most mentally retarded offenders cannot be deterred by that which they cannot
comprehend as a possible punishment.
Perhaps the Court's most compelling argument ... is that mentally retarded offenders
may be sentenced to death due to procedural errors that damage the offender's opportunity to
mitigate the aggravating factors required for a death sentence. For instance, the Court points
out that mentally retarded offenders are more likely to give false or coerced confessions, and
may be less able to assist in the defense. Furthermore, because such an offender often cannot
process and understand the proceedings, he is more likely to exhibit a lack of remorse, which
juries will take into consideration during sentencing.
Linda A. Malone, From Breard to Atkins to Malvo: Legal Incompetency and Human Rights Norms on
the Fringes of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 363, 391-92 (2004) (footnotes
omitted).
51. See Malone, supra note 50, at 392.
52. See, e.g., Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 11-12 (2017) (notwithstanding the defendant's memory
loss, the Court held that he was competent to be executed); Madison v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 851 F.3d 1173,
1189-90 (1 lth Cir.) (determining defendant's competence to be executed), cert. granted sub nom. Dunn
v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9 (2017).
53. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
54. See id at 418.
55. Idat410.
56. Id. at 401.
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examined him for execution, however, agreed that he was insane.57
The Court in Ford gave no further delineation of how to determine if a
defendant was too insane to be executed.58 It did state that neither the
purposes of retribution nor deterrence would be served, and that such an
execution "offends humanity"; specifically, the Court said: "Whether its aim
be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of
understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of
exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth
Amendment." 59 It would be over twenty years before the Court would
provide any guidance as to who is too insane to be executed.6°
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Panetti v. Quarterman reversed a Fifth
Circuit holding that Scott Panetti could be executed despite his belief that
Texas was executing him to stop him from preaching. 61 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals had determined he was competent to be executed because
he was aware of his pending execution and the "factual predicate" for the
execution.62 This approach was deemed too restrictive, as it deemed
irrelevant Panetti's mentally delusional belief as to why he was being
executed as long as he merely knew why the state said he was being
executed.63 At the very least, according to the Court, the inmate must have a
"rational understanding" of the reason for the execution, to some extent
echoing the rational understanding aspect of the Dusky
competency-to-be-tried test.64 As discussed infra, Panetti has not yet been
executed.65 If anything, his mental condition appears to have deteriorated as
one of the geriatric prisoners of death row.66
A recurrent observation can be drawn from all of these cases and
rationales. The filter for various forms of mental incompetency pre-trial and
during trial are doing little or nothing to filter out those more in need of
treatment than incarceration. 67 The fact-specific discussion ofjust a few cases
57. Id. at 413.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 409-10.
60. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007).
61. Id. at 962.
62. Id. at 942.
63. Id. at 956-58.
64. Id. at 956; see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (explaining that in order to stand trial,
a defendant must have the ability to consult with his lawyer as well as a rational and factual understanding
of the proceedings against him).
65. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (detailing instances from Panetti's trial and
evidence of his incompetency). As of September 2018, one of the more recent decisions to be filed in
regard to Panetti occurred in March 2018. See In re Panetti, 714 F. App'x 449, 450 (5th Cir. 2018)
(denying petitioner's request for writ of mandamus).
66. See generally Editorial, Scott Panetti, TEX. DEFENDER SERV. (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.texas
defender.org/scott-panetti/.
67. See generally Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). See also Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (discussing the reasons why mentally ill individuals should not be given
the death penalty).
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that follow makes this observation more compelling in the current
circumstances of death row cases.
In Hall v. Florida in 2014, the Supreme Court imposed a limit on how
the states could measure mental disability for purposes of the Atkins
exclusion from the death penalty.68 According to the Court, where an IQ score
is close to but above 70, courts must account for the test's standard error of
measurement.69 In Moore v. Texas, decided three years later by the Court in
a 5-3 vote, Moore had an IQ range of 69-79.70 After he had spent thirty years
on death row, the state habeas court concluded he had a mental disability
under Atkins. 71 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the final state court for
habeas review, conducted its own hearing and held he could be executed
under Atkins.72 The appellate court, using the "Briseno factors, 73 determined
that Moore's adaptive abilities were beyond those indicated by his IQ.74
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, agreed that the Briseno "lay" factors were an insufficient substitute
for recognized medical criteria.75 In June 2018, however, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals again held that Moore had failed to demonstrate
intellectual disability.76 In doing so, the court seems to have ignored not only
the Supreme Court but also the agreement of Texas state prosecutors that
Moore is intellectually disabled.77
Perhaps the strangest twist of events followed the Supreme Court's
landmark opinion in Atkins v. Virginia.78 On remand in 2006, a Virginia jury
found that Atkins was not intellectually disabled. 79 The jury was convinced
that Atkins had spent so much time with his lawyers that his IQ had been
raised above 70 so that he could be subject to the death penalty. 80 In 2008,
68. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721-24 (2014).
69. Id. at 724.
70. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017).
71. Id. at 1044.
72. Exparte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552.
73. Id. at 556-57. The Briseno non-exclusive factors used to determine whether adaptive deficits are
due to intellectual disability include: (1) "Did those who knew the person best during the developmental
stage-his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was mentally retarded at that time,
and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?"; (2) "Has the person formulated plans and carried
them through or is his conduct impulsive?"; (3) "Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that
he is led around by others?"; (4) "Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate,
regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?"; (5) "Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point
to oral or written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?"; (6) "Can the person hide
facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests?"; (7) "Putting aside any heinousness or
gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought,
planning, and complex execution of purpose?" Id.
74. Id. at 575.
75. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050-51.
76. Exparte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552.
77. Id. at 579.
78. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
79. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 631 S.E.2d 93, 101-02 (Va. 2006).
80. Id. at 154.
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however, a state circuit court judge held that there had been prosecutorial
misconduct in Atkins's hearing. 81 Instead of ordering a new trial, the judge
reduced his sentence to life.82 Finally, in 2009, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that neither mandamus nor a writ of prohibition were available to
overturn the circuit court judge's sentencing. 83
III. THE SUPREME COURT STRUGGLING WITH THE AFTERMATH OF FORD
AND PANETTI
On October 2, 2018, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in the case of Madison v. Alabama.84 The death row inmate had
dementia and cannot remember any of the crime for which he is to be
executed. This summary barely begins to describe Mr. Madison's mental
and physical deterioration. Vernon Madison, age sixty-seven, has suffered
two strokes, is blind, and incontinent.86 His slurred speech often does not
make sense.87 For example, "[h]e has asked that his mother be told of his
strokes," although he has been told that his mother is dead.88 He soils himself
because he says the guards will not let him out to use the bathroom, although
there is a toilet in his cell.8 9 He talks of plans to move to Florida and can only
recite the alphabet to the letter G.9" According to the Alabama Attorney
General, however, Madison's conviction was justified because he
"understood what he was accused of and how the state planned to punish
him."91 Is that a "rational understanding" of the execution?
92
Mr. Madison's thirty-year case exemplifies other recurrent problems in
death penalty cases. His first conviction was overturned because prosecutors
excluded all the black jurors.93 His second conviction was overturned for
prosecutorial misconduct. 94 In his third trial, the jury voted for life in prison,
but the trial judge overrode that verdict and imposed the death penalty.95 The
judge has overridden six jury verdicts of life to impose the death penalty. 96
81. In re Commonwealth, 677 S.E.2d 236, 237-38 (Va. 2009).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 244.
84. Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505 (S. Ct. argued Oct. 2, 2018).
85. Adam Liptak, Too Old to Be Executed? Supreme Court Considers an Aging Death Row,








92. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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Shortly after Justice Scalia's death, the Supreme Court deadlocked 4-4 on
overturning the appellate court's stay of the death sentence. 97 If Justice Scalia
had been on the bench, the outcome presumably would have been different.98
Panetti's current outcome has been unsatisfactory, whether from the
perspective of a proponent or opponent of the death penalty. In his case prior
to the Supreme Court ruling, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said his
delusions were irrelevant so long as Panetti was aware that the State had
"link[ed]" his crime to the punishment.99 It should be noted that Panetti, who
represented himself, called the Pope, Jesus, and John F. Kennedy as
witnesses for his defense.'0° On remand, the district court for Texas
concluded Panetti, despite a long history of paranoid schizophrenia, "failed
to show that his mental health had substantially changed" since the 2007
evaluation; therefore, he could be killed.1"1 This time the appellate court, in
September 2018, ordered the lower court to re-evaluate his competency
because a decade had passed.10 2 The court noted that, since his last mental
evaluation, prison guards (guards!) have claimed he is delusional, saying he
is the father of Selena Gomez and that Wolf Blitzer showed his prison card
on television.'0 3 The appellate court, however, refused to address the merits
of his claim of incompetency. 0 4
Clearly, Panetti is a prison inmate who should not be in the general
population. However, that is not even remotely the question. Should he be in
prison? Executed? Or treated? The answer depends on two words; that is,
what constitutes a "rational understanding"?10 5
IV. PHYSICAL INCOMPETENCY FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
A. The Supreme Court Struggling with the Aftermath ofGlossip v. Gross
Death row prisoners are not the only inmates growing old in prison and
in need of medical care. In fiscal year 2016, the Bureau of Prisons spent $1.3
billion on health care with roughly 12% of prisoners being age fifty-five or
97. Id.
98. Id. "Mr. Madison is one among a growing number of aging prisoners who remain on death row
in this country for ever longer periods of time .... Id.
99. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007).
100. Jolie McCullough, Texas Death Row Inmate Scott Panetti to Get Further Competency Review,
TEX. TRIB. (July 11, 2017, 8:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/07/1 1/texas-death-row-inmate-
scott-panetti-get-further-competency-review/.
101. Panetti v. Davis, 863 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 2017) (summarizing the district court's reason for
denying Panetti's motion for a stay of execution).
102. Id. at376.
103. McCullough, supra note 100.
104. Panetti, 863 F.3d at 376.
105. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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older.10 6 Federal inmates include prisoners in their nineties. 10 7 For those not
on death row who are very sick or very old, "compassionate release" is
theoretically available.'08 The reality, however, is that the Bureau of Prisons
approves only 6% of the applications, often denying applications over the
opinions of doctors and wardens.0 9 However, this theoretical option is not
available to elderly, seriously ill death row inmates." 0 The result is that
prisons increasingly find themselves providing life-saving medical treatment
to death row inmates so they can be eventually executed."'
Against these statistics, the Court's 2015 decision in Glossip v. Gross
seems a notable victory, as it were, for the death penalty, despite the physical
difficulties and possible suffering caused for the ailing prisoner. 112 In the
then-almost-inevitable 5-4 split, the Court refused to find that the specific
method of execution, a three-drug protocol begun with Midazolam,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment." 3 However, the decision is at best
a limited victory for the death penalty given the specificity of the method in
question and the construction of an Eighth Amendment test that necessarily
prompted a current of additional Eighth Amendment claims.' More
importantly, the majority opinion was largely eclipsed by Justice Breyer's
dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, which called for total abolition of the
death penalty."' The method of execution itself was the unavoidable result
of a refusal of drug suppliers outside the United States to continue supplying
drugs for execution purposes, and Justice Breyer's dissent brought to the
forefront, once again, the isolation of the United States' acceptance of the
death penalty."
6
Justice Kennedy was notably silent beyond joining in the opinion." 7 On
a normative level, the majority opinion offers two reasons for affirming the
106. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-379, BUREAU OF PRISONS: BETTER PLANNING
AND EVALUATION NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND AND CONTROL RISING INMATE HEALTH CARE COSTS 49
(2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685544.pdf.
107. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OLD BEHIND BARS: THE AGING PRISON POPULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0ll2webwcover
_0.pdf.
108. KIDEUK KIM & BRYCE PETERSON, AGING BEHIND BAIRs: THE TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
GRAYING PRISONERS IN THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 23 (2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default
/files/publication/3380 1/413222-Aging-Behind-Bars-Trends-and-Implications-of-Graying-Prisoners-in-
the-Federal-Prison-System.PDF.
109. Christie Thompson, Old, Sick, and Dying in Shackles, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:00
AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/07/old-sick-and-dying-in-shackles.
110. KIM &PETERSON, supra note 108.
111. David Delgado, State Is Wasting Money on Death-Row Health Care, MAIL TRIB. (June 14,
2009), http://mailtribune.com/opinion/state-is-wasting-money-on-death-row-health-care.
112. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
113. Id. at2733.
114. Bucklew v. Precythe, 138 S. Ct. 1706 (2018) (mem.); Smith v. Ryan, 137 S. Ct. 1283 (2017).
115. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2776-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at2775.
117. See id at 2730 (majority opinion).
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court of appeals's decision denying the prisoners' application for a
preliminary injunction against execution:
For two independent reasons, we also affirm. First, the prisoners failed to
identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails
a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth Amendment
method-of-execution claims. Second, the District Court did not commit
clear error when it found that the prisoners failed to establish that
Oklahoma's use of a massive dose of midazolam in its execution protocol
entails a substantial risk of severe pain.III
To obtain any preliminary injunction, the petitioners must establish a
likelihood of success on the merits.119 The plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees
provided so little guidance as to the constitutional limits on methods of
execution that no outcome on the merits might be deemed likely.12 °
According to the majority, with respect to this specific method of execution,
the district court did not commit clear error in its factual determination that
the evidence failed to establish that the protocol entailed a substantial risk of
severe pain. 121 Procedurally, this case, on its facts, failed to meet the standard
for a preliminary injunction or to provide the necessary evidentiary basis as
to pain inflicted by the protocol. 122
The significant normative precedent of the Glossip majority opinion is
the imposition of a requirement on prisoners to identify a "known and
available alternative method of execution .... It is this purported
requirement, supported only by a "see" citation to the plurality opinion in
Baze, that triggered the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor (joined by
Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg), which necessitated the footnote in
Justice Alito's opinion elaborating on the holding in Baze, given that only
Justices Kennedy and Alito joined in the reasoning of the Chief Justice's
opinion.
121
Beyond procedural hurdles and searching for some common thread in a
fractured plurality Court decision, Baze is a very slender reed on which to
find a method of execution (which Justice Ginsburg twice compares to the
chemical equivalent of being burned alive) 125 or the death penalty to be
sufficiently humane under the Eighth Amendment.1 26 Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito dismiss years of credible empirical evidence on the
118. Id. at 2731 (citation omitted).
119. Id. at2737.
120. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61-62 (2008) (plurality opinion).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737.
124. Id. at 2731, 2738 n.2; id. at 2780-97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
125. Baze, 553 U.S. at 114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Baze, 553 U.S. at 48 (plurality opinion).
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discriminatory and otherwise arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, yet
require of prisoner-petitioners in Glossip to advance clear evidence,
medically and scientifically, that the proposed method of execution imposes
a severe level of pain and that the "known and available alternative" imposes
less pain.127
It is not surprising, then, that a challenge to a method of execution based
on its physical effects on the inmate is again before the Court. In Bucklew v.
Precythe, argued in the October 2018 term, the Missouri inmate suffers from
a rare medical condition, cavernous hemangioma, which he alleges will cause
him to choke on his own blood in excruciating pain if put to death by lethal
injection. 128 In this case, unlike Glossip, he proposed an alternative of death
by lethal gas. 129 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, determined
that the inmate had not shown this alternative would be less painful.13°
Therefore, the court of appeals used the second prong of Glossip and the
demanding evidentiary standard of evidence it imposes on the prisoner to
require a showing of scientific uncertainty on complex issues of medical
science.1 ' In other words, the death row inmate must demonstrate with
medical evidence that the court committed clear error when it found that
Oklahoma's use of a massive dose of Midazolam in its execution protocol
did not entail a substantial risk of severe pain and that the prisoner failed to
establish there was a known, available, and less painful alternative.'
32
As difficult as these requirements are in the abstract, they involve the
courts making case-by-case, fact-specific medical evaluations in relation to
complex determinations of the particular prisoner's medical condition. The
grant of certiorari thus compels the Court to do the same or double-down on
the high evidentiary bar it has imposed on such claims.
Three states-Oklahoma, Alabama, and Mississippi-have authorized
the use of nitrogen gas and are developing protocols for its use.'3 3 Ironically,
lethal injection was substituted for the electric chair and lethal gas forty years
ago as more efficient and humane. 134 In February 2018, an Alabama
execution team tried for more than two hours to find a vein on an inmate
whose veins were damaged by chemotherapy and drug use before giving
up. 135
127. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731-46; id. at 2746-55 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1706 (2018) (mem.).
129. Id. at 1093.
130. Id. at 1096.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kim Chandler, Alabama 3rd State to Allow Execution by Nitrogen Gas, AP NEWS (Mar. 22,
2018), https://www.apnews.com/9d8ca52c7fa242b7b98a060709380698.
134. See A Glance at the 5 Execution Methods Allowed in the US Today and How They Work, FOX
NEWS (May 23, 2014), https://www.foxnews.com/us/a-glance-at-the-5-execution-methods-allowed-in-
thc-us-today-and-how-they-work.
135. Denise Grady & Jan Hoffman, States Turn to an Unproven Method of Execution: Nitrogen
Gas, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/health/death-penalty-nitrogen-
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Nebraska and Nevada plan to start using the notorious opioid Fentanyl
as a sedative before giving the injections that paralyze and stop the heart of
the inmate. 136 In August 2018, Nebraska used the opioid for the first time in
the United States to execute a man who had been on death row for thirty-eight
years. 137 Journalists' eyewitness accounts indicate something may have gone
wrong, as the execution might have taken longer than expected, and there
were descriptions of Moore coughing and his face reddening. 138 A German
pharmaceutical company that produces two of the other drugs used in the
execution sued unsuccessfully to prevent the execution, arguing that its
reputation would be harmed if its drug was used to kill and its contracts
prohibit sales to prisons for executions, so Nebraska must have obtained the
drugs illegally. 139 Nebraska has fought to not disclose the source of the
drugs. 140  Pharmaceutical companies have filed similar suits against
Nevada. 141 Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Utah filed an amicus brief in one of the cases in support of
Nevada. 142
V. POPE FRANCIS AND THE SUPREME COURT
From my November 2015 article for a Duke Law Review symposium
on the death penalty, the demise of the death penalty by a 5-4 vote seemed
possible, even likely.143 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented in Glossip,
calling for abolition of the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment. 144
executions.html; Sandee LaMotte, Death Row Inmate Sues After 'Botched' Execution, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/07/healtlalabama-execution-lawsuit/index.html (last updated Mar. 7,
2018, 6:31 PM).
136. Mark Berman, Nebraska Cleared to Carry Out America's First Fentanyl Execution, Judge Says,
INDEP. (Aug. 12, 2018, 12:28 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/fentanyl-
execution-nebraska-lethal-injection-fresenius-kabi-capita-punishment-moore-a8488021 
.html.
137. Nebraska Carries Out First US Execution Using OpioidFentanyl, ALJAZEERA (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/nebraska-carries-execution-opioid-fentanyl-180814185512400
.html.
138. Mitch Smith, Fentanyl Used to Execute Nebraska Inmate, in a First for U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/carey-dean-moore-nebraska-execution-
fentanyl.html.
139. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Nebraska Plans First Execution in 21 Years. Not So Fast, Drug Company
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/nebraska-execution-lawsuit.
html; German Drug Maker Sues to Halt Planned Execution in Nebraska, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2018,
5:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/08/german-drug-maker-sues-to-halt-planned
-execution-in-nebraska.
140. See German Drug Maker Sues to Halt Planned Execution in Nebraska, supra note 139.
141. Id.
142. See Associated Press, 15 States, Including Arkansas, Side with Nevada over Drugmaker Delay
of Execution, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETrE (Aug. 7, 2018, 8:11 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com
/news/2018/aug/07/15-states-including-arkansas-side-nevada-drugmaker/?f=news-arkansas.
143. See Malone, supra note 14, at 109.
144. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755-80 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Justices Sotomayor and Kagan also wrote a blistering dissent, comparing the
possible complications from the proposed method of execution to suffocating
and being burned alive.' 45 Justice Kennedy was the principal author of a
sequence of decisions limiting the availability of the death penalty, and joined
the Glossip majority without writing a separate opinion.' 46 With the right
case, Justice Kennedy's swing vote seemed possibly poised to swing toward
abolition, and the litmus test cases seemed to be in the pipeline on its way to
the Supreme Court.
14 7
What a difference one year and an election can make. Three months
after President Trump's election, Justice Scalia unexpectedly passed away on
February 13, 2016.148 In the last year of his presidency, President Obama
nominated D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Merrick Garland. 149 The rest,
as they say, is history. Judge Garland's Senate consideration was delayed
until President Trump was able to nominate Neil Gorsuch, who was
confirmed by the Republican-controlled Senate. 150 The possibility that
Justice Kennedy might vote for abolition became moot when he announced
he would retire at the end of July 2018, handing President Trump the
opportunity to nominate another D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals judge, Brett
Kavanaugh, to the Court.' 5' The political race was on to block or confirm his
nomination before the November 2018 midterm elections.1
52
In short, it was a significant reversal for opponents of the death penalty
before the Court. The only encouraging development for opponents came not
from the political system or the judicial system, but from an unexpected
source. In August 2018, Pope Francis decreed that the death penalty was
wrong in all cases, changing the Catholic catechism that accepted the death
penalty if it was the only practicable way to defend lives.153 The catechism
145. Id. at 2780-97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. See generally Malone, supra note 14 ("Julius Murphy was sentenced to death for robbing and
killing a stranded motorist in Texas. One of his lawyers is Neal Katyal, an experienced Supreme Court
litigator and former Acting Solicitor General of the United States (and former law clerk to Justice Breyer).
The brief to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals included a general challenge to the death penalty.").
148. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 13,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
149. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President Announcing Judge Merrick Garland as His
Nominee to the Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016, 11:04 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2016/03/16/remarks-president-announcing-judge-merrick-garland-his-nominee-supreme.
150. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenbeimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court
Justice, N.Y. TtMES (Apr. 7, 2017), bttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court.html.
151. Nina Totenber&Noel King, Trump Picks Kavanaugh to Replace Retiring Justice Kennedy, NPR
(July 10, 2018, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/10/627588065/trump-picks-brett-kavanaugh-to-
replace-retiring-justice-kennedy.
152. Tina Nguyen, The Democratic Endgame in the Fight to Block Kavanaugh, VANITY FAIR (Sept.
5, 2018, 3:21 PM), bttps://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/09/democratic-strategy-brett-kavanaugh-
confirmation.
153. Cindy Wooden, Update: Pope Revises Catechism to Say Death Penalty Is 'Inadmissible', CATH.
NEWS SERV. (Aug. 2, 2018, 7:37 AM), http://www.catholicnews.com/services/englishnews/2018/pope-
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now says that the death penalty "is an attack on the inviolability and dignity
of the person ... ,,154
The expansive debate over whether religious views do, or should,
influence judicial decision-making is far beyond the scope of this article. The
religious composition of the Court, nevertheless, has made speculation
inevitable.15 5 Statistically, there is a linkage between religious affiliations and
support or opposition to the death penalty.156 A poll of the Pew Research
Center conducted in April and May 2018 found that 73% of white,
evangelical Christians supported the death penalty. 57 According to the poll,
53% of Catholics also supported the death penalty for murder. 5 8 What effect
will the Pope's decree have on these beliefs, and what does the Pope's decree
mean, if anything, for the predominantly Catholic Supreme Court? Justices
Roberts, Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor are Catholic, as is Justice
Kavanaugh. 159  Justice Gorsuch was raised Catholic but attends an
Episcopalian church. 160 Will Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, possibly
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh be influenced by the Pope's decree? Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan are Jewish, and along with Justice Sotomayor
are generally characterized as the "liberal" votes on the Court. 61 Before his
death and the Pope's decree, Justice Scalia (whose brother is a Catholic
priest) felt the need to explain his belief that the catechism allowed for the
death penalty in some cases.1 62 In 2015, while in the United States, Pope
Francis spoke specifically-to the American death penalty as being illegitimate
because of erroneous convictions and badly conducted executions.1 63 The
revises-catechism-to-say-death-penalty-is-inadmissible.c fin.
154. Id.
155. See Sarah McCammon & Domenico Montanaro, Religion, the Supreme Court and Why It
Matters, NPR (July 7, 2018, 11:42 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/07/626711777/religion-the-
supreme-court-and-wby-it-matters.




159. Michael S. Rosenwald, Judge Brett Kavanaugh - a Catholic - Faces a Historical Struggle
Between Canon and Constitutional Law, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/07/08/catholics-on-the-court-the-historic-struggle-between-canon-and-
constitutional-law/.
160. Daniel Burke, What Is Neil Gorsuch 's Religion? It's Complicated, CNN, https://www.cnn.com
/2017/03/18/politics/neil-gorsuch-religion/indcx.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2017, 2:37 PM).
161. Ephrat Livni, The Historic Shift in the US Supreme Court's Religious Makeup (Plus or Minus a
Gorsuch), QUARTZ (May 3,2017), https://qz.com/972686/the-religions-of-the-us-supreme-court-justices-
tell-the-tale-of-a-changing-nation/.
162. Elisabetta Povoledo & Laurie Goodstein, Pope Francis Declares Death Penalty Unacceptable
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second concern is at the very heart of the two death penalty cases to be heard
and decided during this Term."
VI. CONCLUSION: THE HUMPTY DUMPTY DEATH PENALTY
The trajectory of death penalty jurisprudence before the Supreme Court
has been erratic at best, chaotic at worst. In just the four years from 1972 to
1976, the Court foreclosed this form of punishment only to reinstate it.'65 Just
one year later, the Court began a process of categorical exclusions from the
death penalty, and what one commentator described as an "unparalleled level
of constitutional micromanagement" as to how the death penalty can be
imposed procedurally and when it can be imposed based on the nature of the
offense and the status of the offender. 1
66
Now the Court finds itself mired in the intricacies of methods of
execution and fact-specific determinations of the level of suffering inflicted
on the prisoner within the Eighth Amendment demands of proportionality
and penological purposes.' 67 Absent compelling empirical evidence that
executions, particularly of those offenders with minimal understanding of the
process and its purpose, and the growing recognition that decision-making in
capital sentencing is arbitrarily applied, whatever the procedures followed,
determined instead by extraneous factors such as geography and
prosecutorial agendas, public perceptions of the American criminal justice
system, within and outside the United States, are teetering on the ledge of a
lack of objectivity and integrity.' 68
In 2016, I wrote that with the death of Justice Scalia, Congress had a
much needed opportunity to salvage the public image of the Supreme Court
and renew much needed respect for the highest court in the land. 169 As those
words were being written, however, the "political fracas" over whether Judge
Garland would even get a confirmation hearing was brewing and would result
in the political outcome discussed above.170 As these words were being
written, a hearing was taking place on allegations of sexual assault by then-
Judge, now Justice, Kavanagh, who was confirmed by a vote the following
164. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 138 S. Ct. 1706 (2018) (mem.); Madison v. Alabama, 138 S. Ct. 1172
(2018) (mem.).
165. Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that North Carolina's
mandatory death sentence for first degree murder is unconstitutional), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the death penalty violated the petitioner's Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights), with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (stating that the death penalty did not
violate the Constitution).
166. Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy of Atkins and Roper: The Unreliability Principle, Mentally
Ill Defendants, and the Death Penalty's Unraveling, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 487, 489 (2014).
167. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
168. See generally Malone, supra note 14.
169. Id. at 141.
170. See id.
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day. 171 At this juncture, death penalty jurisprudence, and perhaps the
reputation of the Court itself, is beyond repair. All the king's horses and all
the king's men (and women) cannot rule, tinker, or micromanage the death
penalty in a way that ensures compliance with the evolving standards of
decency and humanity the Court has in the past recognized as the
fundamental norm of the Eighth Amendment. Its reinstatement in Gregg v.
Georgia is a failed experiment with human life that has devolved into human
experimentation in methods of execution of often feeble and otherwise
impaired prisoners.
171. Clare Foran & Stephen Collinson, Brett Kavanaugh Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/kavanaugh-final-confirmation-vote/index.htm] (last updated
(Oct. 6, 2018, 8:02 PM).
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